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Abstract  
One of the issues that arises in BOT contracts are hazards and risks of the project. 
Governments tend to give responsibility of risks to investors as much as possible and among BOT 
benefits for governments and their motivation to use the BOT is to transfer project risks to the 
project company. In practice, this is a relative matter, and the project company is usually unable to 
manage project, control and accept all risks of the project, and depending on which country it 
invests in, it tries to transfer some risks and dangers to the Government or donor state company and 
other participants in the project in different ways including construction contractors, operators, 
suppliers of raw materials, product and service buyers and Data Transfer and cover other risks by 
insurance and in fact take some risks ability which can be controlled and managed.  
Keywords: BOT, Risk, Management. 
 
Introduction  
Infrastructure projects, whether financed by traditional methods or by new methods such as 
BOT financing, due to high financing costs and long delivery time, are considered as risky projects 
and the difference between all projects that are financed by BOT or Boo methods with traditional 
methods that have been financed through the state and public budget  turns back to domestic or 
foreign private sector participation in the financing of projects and transferring projects' risks from 
public to private sector. But the issue is not so simple and due to the fact that infrastructure projects, 
particularly in developing countries for various political, economic, social, cultural, legal reasons are 
considered as high-risk projects, less domestic or foreign private investors are willing to accept all 
risks and invest and if they accept to invest, they take responsibility of maximum risks or hazards 
that have power to control over it and overcome it in order to be able to reduce its impacts to a 
minimum level. Thus, the investor does not take the responsibility of the project and in case of 
accepting some risks by the government or other public corporation as other side of contract and its 
support is willing to invest and finance the project. Accordingly, developing governments, in order 
to attract foreign investment and conduct infrastructure projects that have a significant role in the 
growth and development of that country and help their development, is willing to cooperate with the 
investor in sharing the risks between themselves and it is expected the government or the 
governmental side to undertake risks that are attributable to their actions: Delays resulting from 
failure to provide timely facilities such as electricity and gas as the primary fuel of power plant that 
will disrupt and delay the start of the project or accepts political risks such as changes in law, 
confiscation, expropriation and nationalization that, in this respect, even the government guarantees 
the investor (the Project Company) and applies protective measures. Here the division of risks 
between the host government (investee) with investor which is in the form of a company or 
consortium is mentioned. And, the project company shares other risks with other participants of the 
project participants.  
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Project's features include BOT, a plurality of the people involved in them, and in addition to 
the government or state-owned company and project company, construction contractors, operators, 
buyers, suppliers of equipment and raw materials and the lenders participate in it, all of which tend 
to identify project risks before starting the project and specify necessary measures to manage or 
cover or reduce risks.  
Although generalizing the risks of BOT projects to infrastructure projects is difficult to 
generalize and any host country, every infrastructure part and indeed any BOT project have risks 
and conditions of its own, BOT projects encounter some risks regardless of  the type and subject of 
project which are analyzed in this paper separately and in this article risks management or in other 
words risk allocation between the project companies and the government is paid attention to and 
analysis of risk allocation  between the project companies and other participants  will be studied in 
another article. 
 
The necessity and purpose of research  
In risk management, primarily the presence or absence of risks should be detected. After it 
was determined that the project is faced with the risk, two hypotheses are conceivable. First, risk is 
not important so it should be ignored. Second, it is noteworthy that in this case the risk should be 
controlled, in other words, we should react to the risk. Risk control is possible in some ways: 
First step: Avoiding risk or eliminating it, which means avoiding the risk which is done by 
changes in the project plan, including changes in the scope of work and eliminating high-risk 
activities, risk and the conditions of its occurrence are eliminated and consequently the risk can be 
eliminated. 
Second step: if the risk cannot be avoided, it should be observed whether it can be reduced 
which means reducing the degree of probability of its occurrence and the effects of risk. If we can 
reduce that risk and residual risk is not significant, you should disregard the risk and if the residual 
risk is significant, or the risk cannot be reduced, the third stage begins that it should be observed 
whether or not the risk is catastrophic? If it is not catastrophic and is acceptable, you must accept the 
risk and if it is catastrophic or if it is neither catastrophic nor acceptable, the fourth stage will be 
considered that the risk should be transferred and takes place in one of the two forms, First, by 
insuring the risk, risk is transferred to the insurance companies and institutions. And second, the risk 
is transferred to the host State, construction contractors, operators, suppliers of raw materials and 
equipment and the purchase of the product (Ansari, 2005; Amir Sadoughi, 2004; Masoudnia, Haq 
Parast, Keshvari, et al, 2012;  Azad and Rashidi, 2008).  
The most important point is that the process of allocating risks is that the factor of project 
that takes responsibilities of the project should have all abilities required for appropriate 
management (Ahmadi & Khazaeni, 2005). Accordingly, and in order to manage and allocate  project 
risks efficiently in order for the BOT projects to be successful, it is required to share risks between 
the project participants by raising the following three questions: 
(1) Who can control risk easily, inexpensively, and effectively? 
(2) Who benefits mostly from risk management?  
(3) Who has the greatest incentive for risk control (Delman, 2000:40).  
In other words, in addition to the above three cases, a risk is allocated to a person who access 
more supportive tools and has the necessary financial resources (Uncitral, 2001). In fact, each of the 
components involved in the project, including governments, investors and founders of project must 
adopt specific strategy to deal with the risks that in order to do it, while making clear the risks, risks 
are allocated to the best position to bear and manage the risk (Sebt & Maknoon).  
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Finally, conducting project in non-risk conditions is nearly impossible and because this 
directly influences time and costs etc. and impose costs on the project that should be paid jointly. 
Thus, determining risk taker is one of the most challenging issues in BOT contracts and because the 
parties to the contract face with conflicting goals in  allocation of risks and each one tries to reduce 
the risk and transfer it to the other side, the art of risk management, proper allocation of risk is in 
such a way that meet the objectives of all stakeholders in the most appropriate manner, in such a 
way that all risks are not shifted to one side, but the risks are allocated between the parties in 
accordance with capabilities in risk management and commitment, otherwise, this leads the lack of 
timely correct implementation of the project, an increase of the contract price, conflict and too much 
loss of one of the parties, and consequently reducing the incentive to invest and participate in the 
project implementation (Makuyi, Mahdavi, Faroukhian, 2008). Therefore, allocation of risk is a 
critical factor for project success (khazaeni and Afshar, 2004), and to achieve the goals of the 
project and project conduction (Nabavi Chashmi , Aziz Pur Shui & Ghahramanian, 2012; Azad & 
Rashidi, 2008). 
Among the important issues that justify risk allocation and its transference from project 
companies to other participants is the desire of lenders.  A large part of project and BOT which have 
no direct role in project capital is mainly provided by bilateral and multilateral credit institutions and 
banks which are not directly involved in the construction and operation of the project, however, in 
order to minimize project risks and their control, they insist that the project documents, project risks, 
are divided between the project participants such as construction contractors, operators, buyers and 
suppliers of materials and equipment (Uncitral, 2001). 
 
Contractual structure of risk allocation  
The initial allocation of risk in the project contract is defined between the project company 
and government or state companies under contract which grants exploitation patents to the project 
company (Uncitral, 2001). After signing the project contract, and the allocation of project risks 
including the business risks to the project company, they sign several contracts with other 
participants of the project including construction contractors, operators in these contracts the method 
of  risk distribution between the project company and other parties to the contract determines that 
attempt to transfer project risks to other participants in the project is known as serial distribution of 
risk (Delman, 2000:4o-41) and a series of related contracts for allocating risks include Shareholders 
Agreement, financing contract, construction contract, agreement for equipment supply, raw 
materials and fuel supply contract, purchase contract, operation and maintenance contract (Unido, 
1996:160). 
Due to the original BOT project contract between the government and state-owned 
enterprises on the one hand and other participants in project on the other hand, projects such as 
construction contractors, etc. is signed, in this paper we pay attention to allocation and division of 
risks  of project between the government or the state company and the project company. And the 
division of risks between project company and other participants in the project will be analyzed in 
another article.  
 
Sharing risks between the government and the Project Company or state company 
As mentioned before, among government's objectives in using the BOT method in project 
financing is to transfer project risks to the company project, but this is not an absolute principle 
rather, due to different causes mentioned in the previous section, the above principle is relative and 
it is necessary for the investee government to accept some of the risks of the project and in some 
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cases support the project. In fact, government by taking guarantees and protection measures cover 
some of the project risks. 
 
First topic: risks transferred to the host State 
Host state helps reduction of the project risks and its impact on the company projects in two 
ways. First, it will undertake some risks including political risks that the project Company has no 
control over it; second, by providing guarantees, it covers some risks. 
In principal, political risks such as expropriation or nationalization of project delays and cost 
increase resulting from government actions (including delays in obtaining permits and approvals) 
and the risk of government change and policy climate, score derogation risk and risk of rule change 
which is sometimes called the political risk must be accepted by the host government because the 
government will finally pay compensation for it (Unido, 1996:160). On the other hand, for example, 
about the threat of climate change policy, the government has the ability to control it or with regard 
to the confiscation and expropriation, albeit against a principle of international law, this application 
is considered as a right for the government but they have to compensate, for example, according to 
article 9 of the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act, in case of expropriation or 
nationalization, the government is committed to fairly compensate or against note 2, Article 17 of 
the above Act, if the state laws generation prohibited or stop the execution of financial agreements 
within the framework of this law, the loss up to maximum overdue installments are paid and 
provided by the State. 
 
Second Speech: Providing a guarantee by the government for the project company (to 
reduce risk) 
Providing a guarantee by the host government is a method of supporting the project and 
encouraging domestic and foreign private investment in the BOT method. In order to promote 
participation of the private sector, (domestic or foreign) in BOT projects and in order to resolve 
concerns about the probable risks and dangers of the project, the investee government can  provide 
guarantees which cause the investor to be more motivated to participate in the project. This 
guarantee can be in different forms which is mentioned in the following cases: 
Guaranteeing a permanent minimum income - ensuring optimal rates of foreign exchange - 
guaranteeing an agreed revenue back - guaranteeing against high interest rates - guarantee to offset 
the costs and expenses paid by the government if changes in current monetary laws or generating 
new regulations which influence the new investment. - Guarantee of the tariff adjustment 
mechanism / effects - guaranteed supply of raw materials (including water, electricity, gas, coal, 
etc.).- guarantee the purchase of the product (such as electricity and water, etc.). - For example, the 
Malaysian government in  north Highway project - south with a length of 850 km and conducted by 
the BOT approach taken - committed to offset the cost and expenses of the company under contract 
to pay in case of reducing the volume of traffic on this route and lowering interest rates and foreign 
exchange. Or the Pakistan's government in the project of Karachi's power plant committed to offset 
these costs and ensure the return of dividends in case of reducing the value of its currency and 
reduce the money paid by purchasers of electricity (Rami K. Maras, 2001) 
In Iran's regulations, the government, in order to attract foreign investment, provides 
guarantees and protection which covers cases such as compensation against expropriation or 
nationalization, export and supply of foreign exchange guarantee in case of prohibition of export, 
ensuring compensation for damage resulting from a ban or moratorium of the implementation of 
financial agreements based on legislation or decisions by the government, ensuring the purchase of 
the product in cases where the government is the exclusive purchaser of goods and services 
  
Abbas Borzouei 
 
 
 
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                     3135 
 
produced (Article 9 and note 2, Article 17 of the Law on Promotion and Protection of Foreign 
Investment and Part A and B and article 4 of implementation Regulations) and contract guarantees 
can be pointed to; including the supply of raw materials and fuel, and most importantly, to ensure 
the payment of all contractual obligations of Iran public companies under contract by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, on behalf of the State (Section L, Note 21 of Finance Act 2004, and its 
Implementing Regulations) and Article 24 of the Fourth Development Plan Act. 
 
Article 1: Fuel Assurance  
For the stability of BOT projects' income, especially in the energy sector, fuel availability 
and reliability of supply during the contract period can be crucial, usually the founders of the project 
Company (the private sector, either foreign or local) and the lenders demand the government or 
relevant state agency to conduct comprehensive study on the availability of certain fuels from 
national, regional or other similar external resources, import restrictions. (Unido, 1996:254). 
The type of fuel supply varies from country to country and often host governments supply 
fuel that is abundant and inexpensive in their country. For example, in Laibin B power plant 
construction project of China,  the Chinese government ensured to supply the fuel (coal/oil) needed 
for the project company  according to contract between the parties and the consortium (Project 
Company) were allowed to not accept the fuel not conforming with the terms described in the 
contract. The Chinese government has pledged to ensure the availability of sufficient resources for 
the fuel needed by the consortium. (Wang, Tiong, Ting wash Li, 2000). 
 
Article 2: ensuring Product Order  
Among market concerns and risks and projects' efficiency is the lack or reduction of demand 
for a project product purchase which  effects negatively the revenue stream of the project and the 
capital repay and its profits. Accordingly, among guarantees the host government (especially in 
cases where the goods and services are from the products and services of the government) gives to 
ensure the project company is to purchase products and services specific of the project to the certain 
amount in the real price. 
In most BOT projects, agreement to buy the product, between the government agency or 
Project Company is a central arrangement. The main sources of project financing including loans 
and its interest, operation and maintenance costs etc. are provided by the contractual obligations and 
conditions to be included in the product purchase agreement and conditions of the contractual 
agreement to buy the product and purchase credit is one of the key factors in assessing the private 
founders and lender of the project risk in the BOT method. 
Purchase agreements are usually based on the condition of "pay or take" until the end of the 
project life or at least until the end of repayment of the loan contract. For example, in case of power 
plant foundation in the BOT method, a Power Purchase Agreement with the condition of " pay or 
take " is an absolute and unconditional obligation to pay the regular price and the price of electricity 
for delivery in the regular periods (e.g., Monthly) whether the power purchaser (government or 
state-owned company) receive the electricity or not. In other words, the buyer, either the 
government or state-owned company commits to pay price and product prices and pay production 
capacity of the power plant at the end of the period specified (e.g., Monthly) (Unido, 1996; 
Sheykholeslami Ebrahimi and Farahani, 2010). 
Guaranteeing the payment of the product and its price in a given time (e.g., Monthly), in 
addition to being the guarantee for the loan and interest payments by the project company were 
regarded as an important instrument to reduce income risk and the project company by ensuring that 
the bought product is more likely to show interest to investment in and implement the projects. 
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It is noteworthy that product purchasing guarantee by the government or public company 
does not necessarily include the whole product and is different based on the agreement, for example, 
depending on China's Libin project, which was a power plant construction project, the purchase of at 
least 3,500 million Kw/h of electricity (approximately 63% of the production of the power plant) 
can be guaranteed each year of operation (Wang, Tiong, Ting Wash Li, 2000). 
 
Article 3: guarantee against expropriation or nationalization  
Nationalization is a process in which the property is already owned by private individuals 
according to certain rules, and if there is interest and public purpose, without discrimination and 
with compensation, returned to the ownership of the government (Imam, 1995: 345). 
As a general principle of international law, and in order to comply with national interest and 
in compliance with the law and to fairly compensate the damage occurred, the right of 
nationalization and confiscation of the government were recognized (Mirabbasi, 1992- Lal Sarab, 
2001). In the laws relating to foreign investment or particular laws pertaining to BOT, it has also 
been predicted that projects' properties and capital not be expropriated or nationalized as much as 
possible except in special cases and for public interest or fair compensation of damages.  
In article 9 of the Law on Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act approved in 
2001 states that: foreign investment is not subject to expropriation or nationalization unless to the 
public interest, pursuant to legal process in a non-discriminatory method and upon payment of 
appropriate compensation on the basis of the real value of that investment immediately before the 
expropriation. And in paragraph 4 of Part 1 of Article 4 of the above mentioned law enforcement 
passed in 2002 also it is stated that: "foreign investors are guaranteed against nationalization and 
expropriation and foreign investment in these cases are entitled to compensation". 
 
Clause 4: ensuring against the legislation change 
The project company will invest based on existing applicable law. If the existing laws are 
changed or new laws enacted that have been created or caused a delay in the enforcement of the 
project or its closure, the investor government shall pay for compensation which this situation has 
been predicted in note 2 of Article 17 of the Law on the Promotion and Protection of Foreign 
Investment in Iran. 
  
Clause 5: To ensure currency exchange  
For example, a foreign investor in order to invest in Iran imports cash capital into Iran in 
form of foreign currencies; including dollar, euro, and this capital and its profits should be amortized 
during the operation. Since the revenue of the project during the use is received in the domestic 
currency of the investee country, first the domestic currency should be changed to foreign currency  
to be able to say that the imported foreign capital have been completely amortized. Second, maybe 
the investor for the project financing borrow foreign currency from banks and businesses, the 
principal and interest repay of which shall be in the form of foreign exchange or in order to 
implement the project provide the necessary equipment from suppliers outside the country and 
import it into the country that should be paid in foreign currency that in any case, it is necessary for 
the host government to provide possibility to receive the proceeds from the project during the 
operation in the domestic currency and will be used to repay the capital and profits to the lenders 
and reasonable return of capital and its profit, etc. are easily converted into the foreign currency in 
question. On the other hand, the investor after investment and operation of the project and 
compensation of the capital and profits in domestic currency is inclined to convert the currency to a 
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transferable currency since he wants to transfer capital abroad, accordingly the host government 
guarantees the convertibility of the currency.  
 
Clause 6: ensuring the transfer of capital 
After investing in the host country and project implementation and operation of the project 
and completion of concession period and receiving capital and its profits and taking advantage of it, 
the investor tends to transfer money and its profit to the country of origin. In other words, the 
investor invests hoping that after the implementation of the project and gaining capital and its 
profits, transfer capital to their home country or another country to invest, therefore at the beginning 
of investment he tends to ensure that the host country guarantees the transfer of his capital abroad. If 
the investor knows at the outset that the incoming capital to the host country cannot be transferred 
outside the host country, he will invest. Accordingly, the home state of the investor insures the 
investor of the possibility to transfer capital and profits conducted in form of either exchange or the 
issuance of export. (Articles 13 -17, Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act, approved in 
2001). 
 
Third speech: Other supports of the host government to reduce the risks effects  
  Host country in order to attract and support private sector investment give some other 
concessions and facilities to domestic and foreign private investors among them the followings can 
be pointed to:  
Section 1: The customs and tax privileges 
Among levers and incentives to attract foreign investment in the implementation of projects 
that are privately financed includes host government support in the form of tax exemptions and 
customs granted to the investor or mitigate it. In most of the rules for private investors, tax 
exemptions and privileges were considered the privileges of the foreign investment law and the 
observance of the principle is to attract foreign investment that foreign investors receive the same 
treatment as local citizens are also granted to foreign investors.  
Tax exemptions and customs vary from country to country. Some countries have laws that 
all transactions are related to infrastructure projects with private capital are exempt from customs 
duties and some other duties. In some cases, the law considers tax privileges and authorized the 
project country participation in using the same tax privileges considered for foreign investment. 
Such exemptions and concessions are sometimes included foreign contractors involved in the 
project company. In addition to the privileges with tax exemptions, the national laws of some 
countries to import equipment for use by the Project Company applies exemption from customs 
tariffs. Such exemptions to pay import tariffs on equipment, machinery, raw materials and materials 
entered to be used for primary research, design, manufacture and operation of infrastructure projects 
are considered. 
In Iran, there are examples of tax exemption with regard to activities of natural persons 
including exemption from tax on paid or allocated profit Subject to Articles 135 and 145 and  
exemption from  corporate tax subject to articles 143 and 105 of direct taxes law and tax exemptions 
derived from activities predicted in specific locations can be referred to which are applicable to 
foreign investors under Article 8 of the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 2002 
and Section 1 of Part A of Article 4 of the Rules governing the above rule. 
Section 2: Protection from competition  
Other forms of government support could include guarantees about the lack of competing 
infrastructure project is for a certain period or any governmental agency or company, directly or 
through granting the right to operate to another company will not compete with the project 
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company. For example, if the subject of BOT project is to build a toll road, the founder and lenders, 
want to ensure that no new toll or side road will not be built parallel to the target road. These 
guarantees make sure that the exclusive rights that the company under contract benefited from will 
not be denied during the project activity or at least, will continue until reaching a certain threshold 
of income. Protection against competition may be considered by project company and the lenders as 
an essential requirement to participate in the development of infrastructure in the host country. 
Because loans' pay off and project revenue are usually postponed to sales of products and services 
and is very important for the project company and lenders and banks that the government or state-
owned company under contracts do not entrust concessions of establishment and operation of 
similar projects that would compete with the project Company, to other private, state or public 
companies and the project company should be fully aware of the demand and the proceeds of the 
project for BOT project feasibility and its financing. 
  It should be noted that although protection against competition may cause a monopoly for 
project company, this monopoly should not be detrimental to the consumers of the host country 
(Unido, 1996 : 235). On the one hand concerns of the project company about insurance of certain 
revenue from the project to pay installments and compensate investment and obtain revenue should 
be taken into account. On the other hand, the investee country needs to develop and grow should be 
paid attention to. Also, maybe in some cases in order to help the low-income sector it is necessary, 
for example, to build toll-free or low-toll roads along with toll roads of the project company that 
may affect negatively on the revenue. Thus, the point that should be taken into account by the host 
government (investee) is that there should be a balance between project company's interests in 
gaining predicted revenue from project and country's development and growth and supporting the 
project company against competition continues till the existing needs are met and the products' 
required quality and services are provided and if doing competitive actions to support low-income 
class negatively affect the project process, the government compensate damages of the project 
company (Ansireal, 2001). 
Section 3: sub-income resources (auxiliary) 
One of the other forms of supporting infrastructure project implementation provided by 
private capital including BPT is to diversify and provide side investment by project company which 
is realized by granting more exploitation privileges along with the main project to provide sub-
services and or applying other activities. For example, if the subject of project is to establish a toll 
road, the project company is authorized to make use of sub-equipment of this road like establishing 
a store etc. along the road and the location of toll stations that give more motivation to invest in the 
project. If these subsidiary activities are not profitable enough, the project financing can be 
promoted. 
In order to provide the ground for following subsidiary activities by the project company it is 
necessary for the government to receive the legal permission to grand the right to use properties 
belonged to the authority under contract (for example, ownership of the land next to the area 
considered for the contract) and or grant the project company the right to obtain the cost for public 
use of facilities made by the authority under contract. 
Section 4: participation in the share of project company 
Project capital is provided in two ways: capital share and loan. In some projects another form 
of government support includes direct or indirect participation in the project company's share. 
Government participation in company's share can create a better ratio between share and debt (loan) 
that this kind of participation particularly if the project company cannot gain the necessary capital is 
highly important. In the Water supply project in Izmir, Turkey which is one of the most important 
projects in BOT method, the Izmir Municipality also actively participated in the project.  
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Section 5: permission for imports and exports 
In some cases, the consortium (project company) in order to implement projects requires to 
provide machinery and equipment from abroad, the investee country and import them to the country 
which requires to obtain an import license from the investee country. On the other hand, except 
cases that government or state companies are exclusive buyer of the product and paying the real 
price of product is guaranteed, in other cases in order to sell the product and payment of debt and 
loan and interest from product sale, it is necessary to export product aboard the investee country and 
the export license is issued from the investee government. In paragraph C of article 17 of Iranian 
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act and paragraph 6 of Part A of Article 6 of the 
above mentioned law enforcement, the permission to export project products is given to the 
company as currency transfer. 
For the project company, it is important to issue the import and export license at the first 
chance because project companies in order to finance project resort to borrowing loan from banks or 
credit institutions and delay in providing equipment and machinery required will lead to 
implementation and use of the project and on the other hand in issuing products and selling them 
cause delay in paying debts and loan and its interest to lenders and as a result cause paying 
additional interest that overall on the one side cause loss to the company and on the other side 
project utilization will take long that cause loss for government and the public which are the end 
users of products and services of the project. 
 
Second topic: hazards that are undertaken by the project company 
Qualification of sponsors of project company is the most important factor when assessing 
BOT projects risks which are taken into account by the host government and lenders. In addition, 
their experience and ability to carry out such projects and their credibility and commitment to the 
project and to take risks, as well as the experience, ability and credibility of other participants in the 
project including contractors, equipment suppliers and operators entered into the project by project 
companies are very important for the project. 
Governments and financial institutions demand project sponsors to take an integral part risks 
because the investment return of sponsors is linked to the project long-term success. 4 major risks to 
the project company typically accepted by the sponsors of the project include: the construction and 
completion risks - risks associated with the operation - the risks associated with interest and 
currency rates - risks relating to basic needs. 
 
First speech: construction and completion Risk 
Construction and completion risk is the responsibility for all project development costs, 
additional construction costs and delay costs. Based on project contract, in order ensure adequate 
management of manufacturing risks it is usually require that sponsors do the following: 
• Ensure completion of projects such as providing more funds - specifying the minimum and 
certain level of investment in form of shares' ownership. -during construction or other specified 
period of time, provide guarantees for the repayment of the loan. – Specified ratio of debt service 
coverage and minimum share of debt ownership are kept and determined for the project companies. 
Sign key contracts with fixed price with the main contractor in which the completion and 
implementation guarantees are considered and the cash cost are taken into account for company in 
cases that a specified level of implementation is not performed.  Similar guarantees are demanded 
from equipment suppliers and subcontractors who are faced with the sponsors and lenders - Use the 
proven technology.- during the period of construction, consider insurance. - In case of failure of the 
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contractor or supplier of equipment in performing, the consequences of it are noticed by the 
sponsors of the project. 
 
Second Speech: Risks associated with the operation  
Among important steps of BOT project is the operation stage at which some risks and 
dangers may threaten the project.  
According to the project contract, risks associated with the failure of the operation or 
maintenance of the project must be accepted by the sponsors. Sponsors can manage these risks by 
transferring some of them to the one responsible for maintenance and operation of the project in 
operation and maintenance contracts). Project contract enforce sponsors to insure the operational 
risks (including insurance of project loss and responsibility insurance). Lenders of the project can 
also ask for revenue maintenance accounts (income).  
In order to guarantee the quality of the project operator, government, sponsors and lenders 
consider monitoring and measurement of the operator's activities (e.g., quality and quantity of the 
product) as a necessity. This facilitates relating the loss or liability to actual implementation and 
function of project. In order to ensure an adequate investment and following a defined program of 
maintenance and monitoring BOT projects is also necessary.  
Some lenders consider as necessary technical the assistance agreement between the project company 
and the suppliers of the equipment. 
 
Third speech: the risks associated with providing basic needs 
For construction and operation of the project, raw materials and equipment is needed. And 
sponsors must accept the risks associated with basic needs and to protect themselves against these 
risks, sign contracts for supplying raw materials with fixed price and good quality for a long time. 
Such contracts shall include the followings: 
• Supply of raw materials, fuel and spare parts in the long run - commitments regarding the 
availability, quality and price of products, liability and damages whatsoever in the event of non-
performance of the obligations. - A formula for increase in prices to consider factors such as 
exchange rate and inflation. 
 
Fourth speech: risks associated with interest rate and currency  
There are many tools for management and compensation of risks associated with interest rate 
and currency in the capital market, such as the following method: in the event that in the capital 
market, there are a lot of participants; Each tries to convert the risk to a risk that can cope with and 
reduce it. Sometimes there may be two of the participants who can access their target list of risks 
through exchanging its exchange rate risk. For example, a contract side may have high financial 
commitment with US dollar but his income be in Germany mark and the other side has 
commitments in Germany mark but his income is in US dollar is totally clear that both sides are 
exposed to risks of currency exchange. If these two exchange their commitments, their incomes are 
similar to their commitments regarding currency, and consequently the risk of currency exchange 
reduces. This reason can be used to exchange fixed and floating interest rates to prevent the risk 
associated with interest rates  
 
Third debate: insurance risks 
In some countries, banks' unwillingness to lend without state guarantees creates serious 
problems in the way of financing infrastructure projects by BOT method. To consider this issue, 
export guarantee agencies in various countries and international financial institutions like the World 
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Bank and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and International Investment 
Organization (IFC) and even regional development banks, provided guarantees in this regard which 
include political risks and risks resulting from force majeure events that led to the failure of the 
payment of debts to lenders or risks derived from failure to conduct host government obligations 
including confiscation and expropriation or nationalization of the project, contract termination and 
dangers of war and internal chaos and etc. (Gholi Zadeh, P.161). But difference between guarantees 
of the World Bank and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and international funding 
agencies is that the World Bank demand mutual guarantees against guarantees offered from the host 
government, however, the agency that mainly covered investments of ownership share and also the 
extended loan by investors of ownership share and provides support against political risks, currency 
convertibility, war and internal chaos and ownership deviation demands the host country mutual 
guarantee (Unido, 1996:234). 
 
Conclusion 
Although the main sides of BOT contract were the government (or the governmental agency) 
as investee and the project company as investor but several other sides including construction 
contractors, suppliers of raw material and facilities, financial suppliers, operators, technical 
counselors, financial and legal, and product buyers are involved in it. Multiplicity of contracts and 
the number of people even if they were from different countries causes different risks and hazards 
which over all the political, economic and legal risks can be pointed out. Although the investee 
government tends to assign risks to the project company as far as possible, it does not easily invest. 
Therefore, it is appropriate that the risks of the project to be devided as the case and according to the 
party who has the power to take control. 
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